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Abstract: Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is often associated with pathological uncertainty
regarding whether an action has been performed correctly or whether a bad outcome will occur,
leading to compulsive ‘‘evidence gathering’’ behaviors aimed at reducing uncertainty. The current
study used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate neural functioning in
OCD patients and controls as subjective certainty was rated in response to sequential pieces of evi-
dence for a decision. Uncertainty was experimentally manipulated so that some decisions were associ-
ated with no ‘‘objective’’ uncertainty (all observed evidence pointed to one correct choice), whereas
other decisions contained calculable but varying levels of objective uncertainty based on displayed
probabilities. Results indicated that OCD patients differed from controls on decisions that contained no
objective uncertainty, such that patients rated themselves as more uncertain. Patients also showed
greater activation in a network of brain regions previously associated with internally-focused thought
and valuation including ventromedial prefrontal cortex, parahippocampus, middle temporal cortex, as
well as amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex/ventral anterior insula. In the patient group, a significantly
greater number of positive intersubject correlations were found among several of these brain regions,
suggesting that this network is more interconnected in patients. OCD patients did not differ from con-
trols on decisions where task parameters led to uncertainty. These results indicate that OCD is associ-
ated with hyperactivation in a network of limbic/paralimbic brain regions when making decisions,
which may contribute to the greater subjective experience of doubt that characterizes the disorder.
Hum Brain Mapp 34:1956–1970, 2013. VC 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized
by repetitive intrusive thoughts, ideas, or images that are
distressing and cause significant anxiety. In response to
obsessions, patients frequently engage in compulsive
behaviors that attempt to reduce anxiety. In many cases,
these compulsions take the form of ‘‘evidence gathering’’
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behaviors attempting to reduce uncertainty regarding
whether an action has been performed correctly (i.e., check-
ing that a stove is off or that a door is locked) or whether a
bad outcome will or did occur (i.e., whether a disease will
be contracted or whether harm has befallen a loved one).
When compulsive behaviors are successful in reducing
uncertainty and alleviating anxiety, they do so only tempo-
rarily; research has indicated that compulsions are more
likely to increase uncertainty over the long term [Harkin
and Kessler, 2009; van den Hout and Kindt, 2003]. Consist-
ent with clinical observation, behavioral studies have found
that OCD patients gather more evidence to reach a decision
than controls, even in situations unrelated to OC concerns
[Fear and Healy, 1997; Milner et al., 1971; Volans, 1976].
Although the behavioral phenotype of pathological uncer-
tainty is a prominent feature of OCD, little is known about
the neural basis of this psychological process.
Neuroimaging studies in OCD have identified hyperacti-
vation during resting state and symptom provocation in a
variety of cortical and subcortical regions, with recent meta-
analyses emphasizing the role of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),
medial frontal cortex (MFC), anterior insula/frontal opercu-
lum (aI/fO), hippocampus, caudate nucleus, and thalamus
[Rotge et al., 2008; Whiteside et al., 2004]. Recent research
has linked some of these same brain regions to the experi-
ence of uncertainty. Studies in healthy individuals have
related greater activity in posterior MFC (pMFC)/dorsal an-
terior cingulate cortex (Brodmann’s areas [BAs] 6, 8, 24, 32)
[Grinband et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006; Volz et al., 2003]
and aI/fO (BAs 13, 47) [Preuschoff et al., 2008] to increases
in decision uncertainty. These experiments manipulated
uncertainty by varying the probabilities associated with two
decision outcomes (e.g., the closer both outcome probabil-
ities are to each other and to 0.5, the greater the decision
uncertainty), a type of uncertainty that is dictated entirely
by task parameters (what will be referred to as ‘‘objective’’
uncertainty). However, probabilistic metrics of uncertainty
do not take into account subjective experiences of uncer-
tainty, which are known to vary between individuals with
access to the same information [Weber and Milliman, 1997].
To address this issue, we recently examined neural
activity while healthy subjects observed evidence for an
upcoming decision, relating this activity both to ‘‘objec-
tive’’ measures of uncertainty (i.e., those dictated by out-
come probabilities) as well as self-reported ‘‘subjective’’
measures of uncertainty. Results from this study replicated
prior findings linking objective uncertainty to pMFC, addi-
tionally finding that individuals experiencing relatively
greater subjective uncertainty when accumulating evidence
exhibited more activity in medial OFC/ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC; BA 11, 25), particularly for the
first piece of information observed [Stern et al., 2010]. This
dissociation is interesting considering the divergent cogni-
tive functions that have been attributed to these different
brain regions. Posterior MFC and dorsal aI/fO are thought
to comprise a brain network involved in detecting salience
in the external environment and general monitoring func-
tions necessary to carry out tasks [Dosenbach et al., 2006;
Menon and Uddin, 2010; Sridharan et al., 2008]. In contrast,
VMPFC is part of the ‘‘default mode network’’ (DMN) of
brain regions, which robustly decreases in activity (or deac-
tivates) during externally-directed cognitive tasks. In addi-
tion to VMPFC, DMN includes areas of dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (DMPFC; BAs 8, 9, 10), posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC; BAs 7, 23, 31), lateral temporal cortex including
middle temporal gyri and temporal pole (BAs 20, 21, 38),
hippocampus/parahippocampus, and inferior parietal cor-
tex (BA 39). Unlike pMFC and dorsal aI/fO, DMN regions
tend to become active when subjects engage in internally-
focused mental processes such as imagining the future,
autobiographical memory, counterfactual thinking and sce-
nario construction, and processing of self and theory of
mind [Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Buckner et al., 2008;
Schacter et al., 2008]. Together, these findings suggest that,
in healthy individuals, greater internal focus associated
with VMPFC hyperactivation contributes to the experience
of subjective uncertainty when observing evidence.
Prior studies using paradigms that examine neural
mechanisms of performance monitoring have shown
greater activation of pMFC and aI/fO, as well as a failure
to deactivate VMPFC, in response to errors in patients
with OCD [Fitzgerald et al., 2005, 2010; Maltby et al., 2005;
Stern et al., 2011; Ursu et al., 2003], suggesting altered
functioning in both the salience detection network and
DMN. In this work, we extend these findings by focusing
on a cognitive process relevant for OCD—uncertainty dur-
ing decision-making—using an event-related functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm in which
subjective certainty is rated as sequential pieces of evi-
dence are accumulated for a decision. We hypothesized
that OCD patients would experience greater subjective
uncertainty than controls when observing evidence for a
decision. Furthermore, we predicted that patients would
show greater activity when observing evidence in DMN
regions, particularly VMPFC, consistent with prior find-
ings in uncertain healthy subjects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-six OCD patients and 30 control subjects partici-
pated in the experiment. One OCD patient withdrew
because of discomfort in the scanner, and data from one
control subject were excluded because of excessive move-
ment, leaving a total of 54 subjects (25 OCD and 29 con-
trols) available for analysis. Nine OCD patients were
unmedicated (uOCD) and 16 were medicated (mOCD)
with serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SRIs). All patients met
DSM-IV criteria for current OCD, excluding histories of
psychosis, bipolar spectrum mood disorders, developmen-
tal disorders, and traumatic brain injury. Patients were
free of current Tourette’s syndrome, chronic or transient
tic disorder, and alcohol or substance abuse/dependence,
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and those with hoarding as the primary symptom com-
plaint were excluded. No patients were in a current major
depressive episode. However, because of the high rate of
comorbidity between depression and OCD [Overbeek
et al., 2002], patients were accepted with current depres-
sive disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) (n ¼ 4) or
major depressive disorder in partial remission (n ¼ 4, one
uOCD and three mOCD) or full remission (n ¼ 10, four
uOCD and six mOCD) according to DSM-IV criteria,
which comprised 81% of mOCD patients and 56% of
uOCD patients. Other comorbidity was minimal (general-
ized anxiety disorder: n ¼ 1; specific phobia: n ¼ 2; tic dis-
order NOS: n ¼ 1; impulse control disorder NOS: n ¼ 1;
prior history of social phobia: n ¼ 2; and prior history of
eating disorder NOS, n ¼ 2) and was only allowed if OCD
was the patient’s primary complaint.
Control subjects included 18 unmedicated healthy con-
trols and 11 medicated patient controls (mPCs). Subjects
with any history of OCD were excluded from both control
groups. All subjects in the mPC group were on SRIs (see
Supporting Information Table 1) due to histories of major
depression, and had few comorbidities (prior history of
social phobia: n ¼ 1 and prior history of eating disorder
NOS, n ¼ 2). As the majority of OCD patients were taking
SRIs and had histories of depression, we compared OCD
and non-OCD (control) groups—both of which included
medicated participants with histories of depression—to
better localize group differences to the presence of OCD.
All medicated subjects had been on a stable dose for at
least 6 months before testing.
Subjects provided written informed consent and were
evaluated by a trained clinician using the Structured Clini-
cal Interview for DSM-IV [First et al., 1996]. Symptoms of
anxiety and depression were quantified using Hamilton
Ratings Scales for Anxiety (HAM-A) [Hamilton, 1959] and
Depression (HAM-D) [Hamilton, 1960]. OC symptom
severity (current and lifetime) was quantified using the
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale [Y-BOCS, Good-
man et al., 1989]. Table I shows demographic and clinical
information for all groups. Both OCD groups showed sig-
nificantly more generalized anxiety and depression than
either control group, but were not statistically different
from each other. Table II shows clinical information
specific to the OCD group.
TABLE I. Demographic information
uOCD
(n ¼ 9)
mOCD
(n ¼ 16)
uHC
(n ¼ 18)
mPC
(n ¼ 11) Group differences Post hoc comparisons
Age 23.4 (7.0) 26.0 (5.5) 25.9 (8.8) 29.1 (7.8) ns
Education
(years)
14.3 (1.7) 15.7 (2.5) 15.9 (2.1) 16.1 (1.4) ns
Gender 6 F/3 M 7 F/9 M 9 M/9 F 8 F/3 M ns
HAM-A 11.6 (5.1) 9.3 (4.4) 0.72 (1.2) 3.3 (2.6) D: F(1,50) ¼ 74.5, P < 0.001 mOCD > uHC, mPC
D  M: F(1,50) ¼ 6.1, P ¼ 0.017 uOCD > uHC, mPC
mPC > uHC all P < 0.005
HAM-D 9.4 (4.7) 8.1 (4.0) 0.67 (0.09) 3.9 (4.0) D: F(1,50) ¼ 44.6, P < 0.001 mOCD > uHC, mPC
D  M: F(1,50) ¼ 5.5, P ¼ 0.023 uOCD > uHC, mPC
mPC > uHC all P < 0.02
uOCD, unmedicated OCD; mOCD, medicated OCD; uHC, unmedicated healthy controls; mPC, medicated patient controls; D, main
effect of diagnosis factor; D  M, interaction between diagnosis and medication factors.
OCD and control groups were matched on age, education, and gender. Differences in scores from the Hamilton Anxiety Rating
Scale (HAM-A) and Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D) were evaluated with separate 2  2 ANOVAs using diagnosis (OCD
and control) and medication status (unmedicated and medicated) as between-subjects factors. Values in parentheses represent standard
deviations. Only those effects significant at P  0.05 are shown and followed up with post hoc comparisons using independent samples
t-tests.
TABLE II. Characteristics of OCD group
uOCD
(n ¼ 9)
mOCD
(n ¼ 16)
Group
differences
Lifetime Y-BOCS 27.7 (3.4) 28.8 (4.3) ns
Current Y-BOCS 22.7 (4.9) 20.1 (4.1) ns
Age of onset (years) 11.2 (5.6) 11.8 (4.9) ns
OCI-R washing 4.5 (4.0) 3.7 (2.8) ns
OCI-R obsessing 7.3 (3.6) 7.2 (3.0) ns
OCI-R hoarding 4.2 (3.6) 3.6 (2.9) ns
OCI-R ordering 8.2 (3.9) 3.8 (3.4) t (15.7) ¼ 2.7,
P < 0.01
OCI-R checking 8.3 (3.0) 3.8 (2.1) t (13.4) ¼ 4.0,
P < 0.001
OCI-R neutralizing 4.6 (4.7) 3.7 (3.7) ns
Independent samples t-tests were used to compare uOCD and
mOCD patients. Severity scores from six symptom dimensions
were obtained by summing responses to relevant questions (three
per each symptom dimension) on the Obsessive-Compulsive In-
ventory-Revised [OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002]. Summed scores could
range from 0 (no endorsement for any question) to 12 (maximum
endorsement for all three questions). Values in parentheses repre-
sent standard deviations. Only those effects significant at P  0.05
are shown. OCI-R scores were missing from three mOCD
patients.
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Task
Task instructions and practice trials were presented
before scanning. While in the scanner, subjects received 72
sequences presenting four pieces of evidence used for an
upcoming decision. On 18 sequences, rectangles represent-
ing two decks containing red and blue cards were dis-
played at the top of the screen. Deck A (left side of screen)
contained 100% blue cards and 0% red cards, whereas
Deck B (right side of screen) contained 0% blue cards and
100% red cards (certain sequences; Fig. 1a). On 54 sequen-
ces, Deck A contained 80% blue cards and 20% red cards,
whereas Deck B contained 20% blue cards and 80% red
cards (uncertain sequences; Fig. 1b). Percentages of red
and blue cards contained in each deck were graphically
represented as the proportion of space colored in red and
blue in each rectangle. Subjects were told that the percen-
tages were 20%/80%, so that all participants entered into
the task with the same information about probability. At
the start of each sequence (regardless of whether it was a
certain or uncertain sequence), the experimenter selected
Figure 1.
Sequences of trials in the task. Subjects viewed two decks con-
taining equal but opposite ratios of red and blue cards. One of
the decks was selected at the beginning of each sequence, and
subjects determined which deck was selected by observing four
draws of cards from the chosen deck. ‘‘Objective certainty’’ was
defined as the difference between the two posterior probabil-
ities calculated for the decks using a 50:50% prior (e.g., the fur-
ther away the deck probabilities are from 50%, the greater the
objective certainty regarding the identity of the deck supplying
the draws). ‘‘Subjective certainty’’ was determined by individual
ratings (made on each draw) regarding the identity of the deck
supplying the cards. After observing all evidence, subjects
decided which deck was supplying the draws and feedback was
provided (not shown). (a) On ‘‘certain’’ sequences, the deck on
the left contained 100% blue cards and the deck on the right
contained 100% red cards. Thus, probabilities were furthest
away from 50:50% after the first piece of evidence (at 100:0%),
with accumulating evidence serving to maintain maximal cer-
tainty without providing any new information. (b) On ‘‘uncer-
tain’’ sequences, the deck on the left contained 80% blue cards
and 20% red cards, whereas the deck on the right contained
80% red cards and 20% blue cards. Objective certainty varied as
evidence accumulated, with some trials increasing certainty (e.g.,
trials where the probabilities moved further away from 50:50%,
e.g., from 50:50% to 80:20%) and others decreasing certainty
(e.g., trials where probabilities moved closer to 50:50%, e.g.,
from 80:20% to 50:50%). Numbers in parentheses represent
posterior probabilities for both decks on each draw.
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one of the decks, the identity of which was kept hidden
from subjects. Subjects needed to figure out which deck
had been selected by viewing four sequential colored
cards (evidence) drawn from the (hidden) selected deck.
On each draw, subjects rated their subjective certainty
regarding which of the two decks (Deck A or Deck B) was
supplying the draws. Ratings were made on a nine-point
scale with ‘‘uncertain’’ at the center and ‘‘certain’’ at either
end (e.g., ‘‘certain’’ for Deck A on left end and ‘‘certain’’
for Deck B on right end). Each subject was informed that
the choices located in-between ‘‘uncertain’’ and ‘‘certain’’
should be interpreted as evenly spaced intermediate cate-
gories between uncertainty and certainty. Responses were
made using an MRI-compatible fiber-optic button response
system (PST, Sharpsburg, PA) attached to both hands. Af-
ter viewing the four draws of cards, subjects were given
the option to choose which deck was supplying the cards
or to decline to make a choice. After the decision, feedback
was presented and a new sequence was started.
On each sequence, the likelihood of Deck A or Deck B
supplying the observed draws was updated as evidence
accumulated. Subjects were told that both decks had equal
likelihood of being selected to supply the draws (i.e., the
prior was 50:50), with posterior probabilities for both
decks computed after each draw using Bayes’ theorem
[see methods in Stern et al., 2010]. ‘‘Objective’’ certainty
was defined as the difference between the calculated pos-
terior probabilities for the two decks (based on observed
evidence) after each card was drawn (throughout this arti-
cle, we report probabilities as percentages). A larger differ-
ence in posterior probabilities (i.e., the further away that
both deck probabilities are from 50:50%, the closer the
probability for one deck is to 100% and the other to 0%) is
associated with greater objective certainty (and lesser
objective uncertainty) regarding the identity of the desk
supplying the draws. By contrast, ‘‘subjective’’ certainty
was determined by subjects’ individual ratings and was
not required to be based on deck probabilities.
For certain sequences (Fig. 1a), the first draw observed
updated the posterior probabilities from the 50:50% prior
probability to 100:0% (and thus increased objective certainty,
18 trials), with accumulating evidence (draws 2–4) providing
no additional information (draws that ‘‘maintained’’ maximal
certainty, 54 trials). For uncertain sequences (Fig. 1b), the first
draw updated posterior probabilities from the 50:50% prior
probability to 80:20% (54 trials), with accumulating evidence
serving to either increase or decrease certainty (108 and 54
trials, respectively) depending on the color of the current and
prior cards. Subjects were informed that observed evidence
would fairly represent what would occur by chance based on
the probability distributions of the decks and that the number
of cards contained in each deck was ‘‘infinite’’ (i.e., counting
of cards would not aid performance).
Each sequence began by displaying the two decks for 500
ms, followed by the four draws (1,750 ms each) and then
the decision (1,750 ms). All stimuli remained on-screen until
1,750 ms had elapsed regardless of when individual cer-
tainty ratings were made. If responses were not made on
time, a message asked subjects to speed up. An interstimu-
lus-interval blank screen was presented for 500–3,000 ms af-
ter each draw and after the final decision, allowing for the
isolation of the BOLD signal for each event. Feedback was
jittered between 500 and 1,500 ms after the decision, fol-
lowed immediately by the start of the next sequence. Tim-
ings were selected by a design optimization program
written in Matlab by RCW, which minimized mulitcolli-
nearity between events for contrasts of interest.
Functional MRI Acquisition and Preprocessing
MRI scanning occurred on a GE 3 T Signa scanner
(LX [8.3] release). A T1-weighted image was acquired in the
same prescription as functional images to facilitate
coregistration. Functional images were acquired with a T2*-
weighted, reverse spiral acquisition sequence (gradient echo
(GRE), time of repetition ¼ 2,000, echo time ¼ 30, flip angle
(FA) ¼ 90, field of view ¼ 20, 40 slices, 3.0/0, matrix diame-
ter 71—equivalent to 64  64) sensitive to signal in ventral
frontal regions [Yang et al., 2002]. Subjects underwent six
runs, each consisting of 127 volumes plus four initial, dis-
carded volumes to allow for thermal equilibration of scanner
signal. After acquisition of functional volumes, a high-resolu-
tion T1 SPGR scan was obtained for anatomic normalization.
Images were presented by a BrainLogics (PST, Pittsburgh,
PA) digital MR projector, which provides high-resolution
video (1,024  768) by back projection.
Preprocessing was performed using the Statistical
Parametric Mapping (SPM) 2 package (Wellcome Institute
of Cognitive Neurology, London), with the exception of
realignment and slice-time correction, which used
MCFLIRT [Jenkinson et al., 2002] and slicetimer (interpo-
lated with an eight-point sinc kernel multiplied by a Han-
ning window), respectively (FSL, Analysis Group, FMRIB,
Oxford). Realignment parameters were inspected to ensure
that movement did not exceed either 3 mm translation or 1
rotation within each run. Parameters for anatomic normal-
ization to the MNI152 brain, an average of 152 T1 images
from the Montreal Neurological Institute, were derived
from the high resolution SPGR T1 image and applied to the
time series of co-registered, functional volumes, which were
re-sliced (voxel size: 3  3  3 mm) and smoothed with a
5 mm isotropic Gaussian smoothing kernel.
Data Analysis
Primary analysis
Behavioral. The main behavioral analysis of interest com-
pared certainty ratings between the groups. Because of
prior work in healthy subjects suggesting that individual
differences in subjective certainty predicted neural activity
most robustly for the first piece of evidence [Stern et al.,
2010], we examined draw 1 separately from accumulating
evidence on subsequent draws 2–4. Draws were also
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segregated based on sequence type (certain or uncertain)
and, for uncertain sequences, based on whether they
increased or decreased objective certainty, resulting in a
total of five different trial types (first piece of evidence for
certain sequences, first piece of evidence for uncertain
sequences, accumulating evidence that maintained maxi-
mal objective certainty, accumulating evidence that
increased objective certainty, and accumulating evidence
that decreased objective certainty). Analyses of subjective
ratings were based on level of certainty reported irrespec-
tive of which deck was selected (Deck A or Deck B),
resulting in five potential levels of certainty that a subject
could endorse, ranging from complete uncertainty (a ‘‘5’’
response on the scale) to complete certainty (‘‘1’’ or ‘‘9’’
responses on the scale).
Subjective ratings for the first piece of evidence were
examined with separate mixed-model (repeated and non-
repeated measures) ANOVAs using sequence type (certain
and uncertain) as the within-subject variable and diagnosis
(OCD and control) and medication (unmedicated and
medicated) as between-subject variables. Similarly, ratings
for accumulating evidence were examined using change
in certainty (‘‘maintain,’’ ‘‘increase,’’ or ‘‘decrease,’’ see
Fig. 1), diagnosis (OCD and controls), and medication
(unmedicated and medicated) as factors. All main effects
and interactions were examined. Significant interactions
were followed-up with one-way ANOVAs looking at sim-
ple main effects.
Functional MRI. All analyses of fMRI BOLD signal were
event-related. In parallel with the five trial types used in
the behavioral analyses, five regressors of interest were
created for neuroimaging analyses, specifying: (1) onsets
for the first piece of evidence (draw 1) on certain sequen-
ces, (2) onsets for the first piece of evidence on uncertain
sequences, (3) onsets for subsequent accumulating
evidence (draws 2–4) that maintained maximal certainty
(certain sequences), (4) onsets for accumulating evidence
that increased objective certainty (uncertain sequences),
and (5) onsets for accumulating evidence that decreased
objective certainty (uncertain sequences). Regressors speci-
fying onset times for the final decision and feedback were
included in the model to account for variance but are not
the focus of the current analysis. Each regressor was con-
volved with the canonical hemodynamic response function
using the general linear model as implemented in SPM2.
Omission trials where subjects did not make a certainty
rating within the deadline were infrequent (5.6  4.5 trials)
and not modeled.
Five first-level contrasts examined activity for the five
trial types in the task versus implicit baseline (brain
responses occurring during blank screens): (1) first piece
of evidence for certain sequences, (2) first piece of
evidence for uncertain sequences, (3) accumulating
evidence (draws 2–4) that maintained maximal certainty,
(4) accumulating evidence that increased objective cer-
tainty, and (5) accumulating evidence that decreased objec-
tive certainty. Results from direct comparisons between
event types (first piece of evidence for certain vs. uncer-
tain sequences, accumulating evidence that increased vs.
maintained objective certainty, accumulating evidence that
decreased vs. maintained objective certainty, and accumu-
lating evidence that increased vs. decreased objective cer-
tainty) can be found in Supporting Information.
Within SPM2, one-sample t-tests examined activations
(e.g., draw > baseline) and deactivations (e.g., baseline >
draw) for each of the contrasts within each group (OCD
and controls) separately, with group-level analyses com-
paring patients and controls using two-sample t-tests.
Tests were thresholded at an alpha of 0.05, cluster-level
corrected for multiple comparisons within whole-brain
gray matter as implemented by AlphaSim in AFNI
[Cox, 1996; Ward, 2000]. This method uses Monte-Carlo
simulations to determine the cluster size required based
on voxelwise threshold, size of search area, and data
smoothness. Based on the average smoothness for com-
parisons made in the contrasts examined (FWHM: 11.27
mm) and using a whole-brain search region, a stringent
cluster size of 86 voxels with a voxelwise threshold of
P < 0.005 was required to reach corrected significance
(corrected P ¼ 0.049).
We also sought to examine correlations between activa-
tions in brain regions that exhibited group differences,
with the prediction that OCD patients would show
greater interregional correlations among hyperactive brain
regions than controls. Parameter estimates were extracted
from 6-mm-radius spheres surrounding peak coordinates
of clusters that differed between the groups for a given
contrast. Correlations between brain regions could only
be examined for contrasts where there were two or more
regions differing between patients and controls (i.e., draw
1 on certain sequences vs. baseline, see Results and Table
IV). Partial correlations (controlling for effects of medica-
tion status and combined HAM-A/HAM-D scores, see
Exploratory analyses section below) were performed on
activations from pairs of brain regions separately for
OCD patients and controls, resulting in a correlation ma-
trix for each group. Note that this analysis focused on
BOLD signal correlations between brain regions across
subjects, which differs from connectivity analyses that
examine correlations between time-series within subjects.
Correlation matrices were compared between the groups
using a Box M (omnibus) test (alpha of 0.05) to deter-
mine whether the overall pattern of correlations between
pairs of brain regions was significantly different between
OCD patients and controls. Significant matrix differences
were followed-up with an examination of group differen-
ces in correlation coefficients for each pair of brain
regions using a Fisher r-to-z transformation with two-
tailed t-tests. Although our step of first requiring signifi-
cant differences between correlation matrices before
examining individual pairs of correlations helps control
for Type I error associated with comparisons between
multiple pairs of correlation coefficients [see Levin et al.,
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1994], we further controlled for false positives by using a
pairwise significance threshold of P  0.01.
Exploratory analyses
Additional exploratory analyses were performed to
supplement information obtained from primary analyses.
Behaviorally, reaction times (RTs) to make certainty ratings
on each draw were examined using the same mixed-model
ANOVAs that were used for the investigation of ratings.
For analysis of brain activation, we sought to determine
whether medication status or generalized anxiety and
depression could be influencing group effects, as our sam-
ple contained more mOCD patients than medicated con-
trols subjects (mPCs), and because OCD patients showed
significantly greater levels of generalized anxiety and
depression (as indexed by the HAM-A and HAM-D, see
Table I). Parameter estimates derived from events/trial
types that were associated with significantly different acti-
vations between OCD patients and control subjects (see
results section) were averaged across all voxels in the
region showing group difference (except where noted in
results) and submitted to multiple regression analyses.
Predictor variables in these regressions were diagnosis
(OCD and control), medication (unmedicated and medi-
cated), and a combined HAM-A/HAM-D score (average
of the two measures for each subject, due to the high colli-
nearity between HAM-A and HAM-D scores), which
allowed us to determine not only whether diagnosis
would remain a significant predictor of brain activity
when controlling for these other factors, but also whether
medication status or generalized anxiety/depression
would account for neural activity in these regions over
and above any effects of diagnosis.
Finally, we also performed multiple regressions to deter-
mine whether OC symptom severity as measured by the
Y-BOCS was related to brain activations in regions show-
ing group differences, while controlling for effects of med-
ication status and generalized anxiety/depression. For
each regression model, the dependent variable was the
extracted parameter estimate taken from a region of group
difference (or sphere around peak coordinate, see results)
and predictors were Y-BOCS scores, medication status,
and combined HAM-A/D score. Separate models were
run for current and lifetime Y-BOCS scores.
RESULTS
Behavioral
Results from ANOVAs examining subjective certainty
ratings and RT can be found in Table III. As can be seen
in Figure 2, OCD patients rated themselves as significantly
less certain than control subjects on certain sequences,
both when observing the first piece of evidence (left) and
when accumulating evidence that maintained maximal cer-
tainty (right).
Functional MRI
First piece of evidence (draw 1) for certain
and uncertain sequences
Activations within and between groups for the first
draw of certain and uncertain sequences are illustrated in
Figure 3 (also see Supporting Information Fig. 1). When
evaluating the first piece of evidence on certain sequences
When evaluating the first piece of evidence on certain
sequences as compared with implicit baseline, OCD
patients showed significantly greater activation than con-
trols in several regions of DMN, including VMPFC, right
parahippocampal gyrus and amygdala, right temporal
pole, bilateral inferior/middle temporal gyri, and, at trend
level (P ¼ 0.06), left inferior parietal cortex/angular gyrus
(Table IV, Fig. 3). In addition, OCD patients exhibited
hyperactivity in bilateral OFC and adjacent regions of ven-
tral aI/fO. There were no regions where controls showed
greater activation than OCD patients at the current thresh-
old. There were no significant differences between patients
and controls in response to the first draw for uncertain
sequences compared with implicit baseline (Fig. 3, right
panel).
Accumulating evidence (draws 2–4) on
certain and uncertain sequences
Within- and between-group effects for accumulating
evidence that maintained maximal objective certainty (i.e.,
deck probabilities of 100:0% on certain sequences) are illus-
trated in Figure 4 (also see Supporting Information Fig. 2).
OCD patients showed significantly greater activation than
controls in a right hemisphere region encompassing supe-
rior and inferior parietal cortex (Table IV) compared with
implicit baseline, with no regions exhibiting greater activity
in controls. Considering that, behaviorally, OCD patients
exhibited greater subjective uncertainty both in response to
the first piece of evidence and when accumulating subse-
quent pieces of evidence on certain sequences, we wished
to determine whether any of the brain regions in DMN
showing hyperactivity in patients to the first piece of evi-
dence (VMPFC, parahippocampus, amygdala, OFC/aI/fO,
inferior parietal/angular gyrus, temporal pole, and lateral
temporal cortex, see Table IV) would also exhibit group dif-
ferences on these subsequent draws. Because of our interest
in DMN, we interrogated activity in these regions using a
reduced threshold (P < 0.005, k ¼ 20). Results from this
analysis revealed greater activity in VMPFC/subgenual cin-
gulate (x ¼ 9, y ¼ 30, z ¼ 18; k ¼ 47) and right temporal
pole (x ¼ 33, y ¼ 27, z ¼ 33; k ¼ 37) in OCD patients
when compared with controls for accumulating evidence
on certain sequences (Fig. 4, bottom panel).
There were no significant differences between OCD
patients and controls for accumulating evidence that
increased certainty compared with baseline (see Support-
ing Information Fig. 3 for effects within each group) or
r Stern et al. r
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decreased certainty compared with baseline (see Support-
ing Information Fig. 4 for effects within each group).
Relationships between brain regions
Partial correlations (controlling for effects of medication
status and HAM-A/HAM-D scores) were performed to
examine relationships between activations in different brain
regions across subjects. We examined the following eight
foci: left OFC/ventral aI/fO, left MTG, right MTG, VMPFC,
right temporal pole, right amygdala, right parahippocam-
pus, and right OFC/ventral aI/fO (these last five foci were
significant subregions in the 416-voxel cluster, see Table
IV), which represent those regions that were hyperactive in
OCD patients in response to the first piece of evidence on
certain sequences. The correlation matrix for OCD patients
revealed a pattern of highly correlated subject-level peak
activity between many of the activation clusters (Fig. 5,
top). Controls also showed correlations between clusters,
but these were mostly confined to the right hemisphere,
with notably fewer cross-hemispheric correlations (Fig. 5,
bottom). A Box M omnibus test of differences in matrices
between the groups was highly significant (v2 (36) ¼ 105.33,
P < 0.001). Follow-up comparisons of correlation coeffi-
cients between the groups revealed significantly more
correlated activity among OCD patients when compared
with controls (P  0.01, two-tailed) for the following
pairs: left OFC/aI/fO–right temporal pole, left OFC/aI/
fO–right parahippocampus, left OFC/aI/fO–VMPFC, right
amygdala–left MTG, and right temporal pole–right para-
hippocampus (Fig. 5, lines in red).
Exploratory analyses
Effect of medication and HAM-A/HAM-D variables. Multi-
ple regression analyses investigated whether brain activa-
tion in regions showing group differences (dependent
variable) was related to effects of medication status and
HAM-A/HAM-D scores (independent variables), which
also differed between groups. To separately examine activ-
ity in subregions comprising the 416 voxel cluster that was
hyperactive in OCD patients on the first draw of certain
sequences (peak coordinate located in right temporal pole),
we submitted extracted parameter estimates from 6-mm-ra-
dius spheres located around five subpeaks of this cluster
(Table IV) to the multiple regression analysis (instead of
using one average parameter estimate for the entire cluster).
For the majority of regions, diagnosis remained a significant
predictor when controlling for effects of medication status
and generalized anxiety/depression. Further, these factors
did not uniquely predict neural activity when controlling
for effects of diagnosis. Two exceptions were found in the
right parahippocampus subregion for draw 1 on certain
sequences and VMPFC/subgenual cingulate for accumulat-
ing evidence that maintained maximal certainty. For these
two regions, none of the individual predictors reached sig-
nificance even though the full models explained variance in
brain activations (trend for right parahippocampus subre-
gion, P ¼ 0.08, and significant for VMPFC/subgenual, P ¼
0.003). This effect is likely due to collinearity between diag-
nosis and HAM-A/HAM-D scores (r ¼ 0.75), which may
have weakened the ability to detect unique variance when
all predictors were entered simultaneously. Follow-up sim-
ple regressions indicated that diagnosis by itself signifi-
cantly predicted activity in the right parahippocampus
subregion (t ¼ 2.7, P ¼ 0.009) and VMPFC/subgenual cin-
gulate (t ¼ 3.5, P ¼ 0.001), as would be expected given that
these regions were derived from whole-brain results of
group differences. Of interest, HAM-A/D scores also pre-
dicted activity in these regions (right parahippocampus: t ¼
2.1, P ¼ 0.04; VMPFC/subgenual cingulate: t ¼ 3.8, P <
0.001), whereas medication alone did not predict activity in
these regions (P > 0.1 for both).
Relationship with OC symptom severity. Lifetime Y-BOCS
scores were not related to brain activation in any of
the regions showing group differences. Current Y-BOCS
Figure 2.
Subjective certainty ratings. Ratings for the first piece of evidence (draw 1) and accumulating
evidence (draws 2–4) on certain and uncertain sequences. OCD patients (n ¼ 25) are shown in
blue and controls (n ¼ 29) are shown in red. Bars represent standard error of the mean.
Asterisks denote conditions showing group differences. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Figure 3.
First piece of evidence on certain and uncertain sequences. (a)
Activations (warm colors) and deactivations (cool colors) for
OCD patients and controls in response to observing the first
piece of evidence (draw 1) on certain sequences (left panel) and
uncertain sequences (right panel). For certain sequences only,
OCD patients exhibited greater activity than controls in ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), anterior parahippocampus,
amygdala, lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)/ventral anterior
insula/frontal operculum (aI/fO), and lateral temporal regions
(middle temporal cortex and temporal pole; bottom left). There
were no differences between the groups when observing the
first piece of evidence for uncertain sequences, and no regions
where controls showed greater activation than OCD patients.
Images are displayed at x ¼ 6 and z ¼ 20 in the sagittal
and axial planes (MNI coordinates), with a voxelwise threshold
of P < 0.005, cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons at
P < 0.05. Color bars represent t scores. (b) Parameter esti-
mates for draw 1 on certain sequences are shown separately for
medicated and unmedicated subjects in the OCD and control
groups to illustrate the absence of medication effects. Estimates
were averaged across voxels located in 6-mm-radius spheres
placed around peak coordinates in regions of the amygdala,
temporal pole, and VMPFC showing group differences (see
Table IV).
TABLE IV. OCD patients > control subjects
Region BA
OCD > Control
k x y z Z
First piece of evidence, certain > baseline
Temporal pole (R) 38 416 36 24 30 4.52
Amygdala (R) 28, 34 24 3 21 4.35
VMPFC (B) 11 9 33 21 3.69
OFC/aI/fO (R) 11, 47 33 15 12 3.35
PG/uncus (R) 28, 34 27 9 24 2.76
OFC/aI/fO (L) 47 194 18 12 18 4.28
ITG/MTG (L) 20, 21 133 60 9 27 3.87
ITG/MTG (R) 20, 21 310 57 27 21 3.85
TPJ/IPL (L) 39, 40 82 54 42 18 3.82
Accumulating evidence, maintaining maximal certainty > baseline
SPL/IPL (R) 40 175 36 72 48 3.81
Regions listed are corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain at P < 0.05. Coordinates are in MNI space.  Significant at
trend level (P < 0.1). There were no regions where controls > OCD at the current threshold.
BA, Brodmann’s area(s); k, number of voxels; Z, maximum z-score; R, right; B, bilateral; L, left; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex;
OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; aI/fO, anterior insula/frontal operculum; PG, parahippocampal gyrus; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; MTG,
middle temporal gyrus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; SPL, superior parietal lobule.
Figure 4.
Accumulating evidence that maintained maximal certainty on
certain sequences. Activations (warm colors) and deactivations
(cool colors) for draws 2–4 on certain sequences in OCD
patients and control subjects. Group differences emerged in
right parietal cortex, as well as VMPFC/subgenual cingulate and
right temporal pole (bottom panel) at an uncorrected threshold
(P < 0.005, k > 20). Images are displayed at x ¼ 8, y ¼ 24, and
z ¼ 50 in the sagittal, coronal, and axial planes (MNI coordi-
nates) with a voxelwise threshold of P < 0.005, k > 20. Color
bars represent t scores.
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scores showed a negative relationship with activity in
the left OFC/aI/fO cluster (k ¼ 194; t ¼ 2.1, P ¼ 0.04)
and in the right parahippocampal subregion (taken from
the 416-voxel cluster, see Table IV; t ¼ 2.2, P ¼ 0.04).
However, visual inspection of scatterplots depicting these
effects suggested that they may have been overly influ-
enced by one subject. Analysis using Cook’s distance
statistic [Cook and Weisberg, 1999] indicated that this sub-
ject was above the critical threshold for influencing the
identified relationships (4/N ¼ 0.16) for both brain regions
(left OFC-Y-BOCS: 0.232 and right parahippocampal-Y-
BOCS: 0.191). Indeed, when this subject was removed
from the analyses, these relationships were no longer
significant.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined how OCD patients experience
uncertainty as evidence is accumulated for a decision. Behav-
iorally, patients exhibited less certainty than controls when
data were unequivocal. Although controls showed essen-
tially no uncertainty when the observed evidence pointed to
a single correct answer (on certain sequences), OCD patients
remained subjectively uncertain even in the face of clear evi-
dence. When accumulating subsequent pieces of evidence on
certain sequences, patients remained significantly less certain
than controls, although this effect was smaller than for the
first piece of information. Although prior behavioral research
in OCD has found that patients report greater subjective
uncertainty than healthy individuals when making a decision
in the presence of uncertainty [Volans, 1976], to our knowl-
edge this is the first experimental report of greater subjective
uncertainty in OCD despite unequivocal evidence. However,
this finding is consistent with the clinical phenomenology of
the disorder, where patients appear to remain uncertain
regarding whether a behavior has achieved a desired goal
(e.g., locking the door or turning off the stove) despite clear
evidence that the goal has been attained (i.e., the patient can
visually perceive that the door is locked or that the knob on
the stove is in the ‘‘off’’ position).
Linking behavior to brain activity, when observing the
first piece of evidence on certain sequences, OCD patients
exhibited hyperactivation in several brain regions includ-
ing lateral OFC/ventral aI/fO (BAs 11, 47), amygdala and
anterior parahippocampus (BAs 28, 34), bilateral middle
temporal cortex and temporal pole (BAs 20, 21 and 38),
and VMPFC (BA 11). Furthermore, patients showed
greater activity in VMPFC/subgenual cingulate and tem-
poral pole when accumulating subsequent evidence on
certain sequences, although group differences in neural ac-
tivity only appeared at a reduced threshold. We did not
find group differences in brain areas involved in detecting
external salience and monitoring task set, such as pMFC
and dorsal aI/fO [Dosenbach et al., 2006; Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Sridharan et al., 2008], suggesting that these
executive functions may be relatively unimpaired in OCD
when observing evidence for a decision.
Many of the areas where OCD patients exhibited hyper-
activation when observing evidence on certain sequen-
ces—VMPFC, parahippocampus, middle temporal cortex,
and temporal poles—are nodes of the ‘‘DMN" of brain
regions that activate during self-focused internal thought
processes such as imagining and predicting the future,
autobiographical memory, scenario construction, and
theory of mind [Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Buckner
et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2008]. As might be expected,
DMN decreases in activation, in some cases deactivating
from baseline, when attention becomes increasingly
focused on external stimuli, such as when a task becomes
more difficult or requires greater cognitive effort
[McKiernan et al., 2003; Pallesen et al., 2009]. Hyperactiva-
tion of default mode network in OCD may reflect an
Figure 5.
Relationships between brain regions. A Box M test revealed sig-
nificant group differences among patterns of intersubject corre-
lations between brain regions for the first piece of evidence on
certain sequences. Positive correlations between individual pairs
of brain regions are shown for each group (P < 0.01, black
lines). Red lines represent correlations that are greater in OCD
patients than controls (P < 0.01). VMPFC, ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex; OFC/aI/fO, orbitofrontal cortex/anterior insula/frontal
operculum; Temp, temporal. [Color figure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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overengagement of internally-focused mental processes to
the detriment of external task demands; in particular, fre-
quent or persistent imagining of negative scenarios and
their relationship to the self may contribute to the charac-
teristic pattern of persistent worry about a potential bad
event that is often found in OCD. Interestingly, DMN acti-
vation in patients was not significantly different from con-
trols for trials on uncertain sequences (both groups
exhibited less DMN activity for uncertain when compared
with certain trials), suggesting that the greater cognitive
effort associated with making a decision in the presence of
actual uncertainty dictated by probability in the task—sup-
ported by the overall slower RTs for uncertain when com-
pared with certain sequences—is sufficient to promote the
disengagement of internally-focused mental processes,
even in OCD patients. It may be only when there is rela-
tively less cognitive demand (i.e., on certain sequences)
that default mode processing emerges and interferes with
patients’ functioning. The current results complement
prior findings of aberrant VMPFC, insula, and parahippo-
campal activity in OCD during symptom provocation and
in tasks focusing on other aspects of the OCD phenotype,
such as response inhibition and performance monitoring
[for reviews, see Menzies et al., 2008; Rotge et al., 2008].
Here, we not only link hyperactivation in these regions to
specific conditions where patients experience heightened
uncertainty during decision-making, but also identify
altered activation in additional regions that are not as
frequently associated with OCD, such as the amygdala
and lateral temporal cortex.
Although the majority of differences between patients
and controls remained significant when controlling for
medication status and generalized anxiety/depression, no
factors uniquely contributed to activity in VMPFC/subge-
nual cingulate in response to observing evidence on cer-
tain sequences. Neither diagnosis nor HAM-A/D
(generalized anxiety/depression) scores uniquely contrib-
uted to activity in VMPFC/subgenual cingulate in
response to observing evidence on certain sequences. This
occurred despite the fact that both diagnosis and HAM-
A/D scores significantly predicted activity in this region
when examined alone, which suggests that VMPFC/sub-
genual activity on these trials can be accounted for by var-
iance that is shared between these two variables. This is
particularly interesting given prior studies suggesting a
prominent role for subgenual cingulate in the pathogenesis
of major depression [Mayberg et al., 1999; Price and Dre-
vets, 2010], and suggests that OCD and generalized nega-
tive affect are both related to subgenual hyeractivation.
The current results are consistent with prior studies iden-
tifying a relationship between VMPFC activity and uncer-
tainty during decision-making. In a previous study using
the same paradigm in healthy individuals only, we found a
similarly positive correlation between VMPFC activity in
response to the first piece of evidence and subjective ratings
of uncertainty [Stern et al., 2010]. However, in this prior
study, the correlation between brain and behavior emerged
when participants observed evidence on uncertain, rather
than certain, sequences [Stern et al., unpublished data]. Fur-
thermore, hyperactivity in VMPFC (as well as amygdala
and OFC) has been found when adolescents with general-
ized anxiety disorder or social phobia with high intolerance
of uncertainty make decisions under complete uncertainty
[Krain et al., 2008]. This suggests that DMN/limbic activity
may be generally associated with subjective experiences of
certainty, and that the type of experimental context that
elicits the relationship between DMN and uncertainty may
vary based on disorder.
The current study also found greater activity in OCD
patients when observing the first piece of evidence on cer-
tain sequences in regions linked to emotional-motivational
functions, such as amygdala and OFC/ventral aI/fO. The
importance of the amygdala in emotion processing is well
documented [for a review, see Phelps and LeDoux, 2005],
particularly for aversive emotions such as fear and sadness
[Blair et al., 1999; Phan et al., 2002; but see Murray, 2007
for the amygdala’s role in positive emotions]. Relatively
less work has been dedicated to understanding the cogni-
tive processes subserved by ventral regions of anterior
insula, which are located inferior and medial to areas asso-
ciated with the detection of external salience [Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Sridharan et al., 2008] and decision uncer-
tainty related to probability [Grinband et al., 2006;
Preuschoff et al., 2008]. Although it remains unclear
whether ventral and dorsal aI/fO are involved in similar
functions, a meta-analysis suggested that ventral aI/fO
activity was related more to experienced emotion, whereas
dorsal aI/fO activity was involved in executive functions
[Wager and Barret, 2004].
Particularly relevant for the present findings, the amyg-
dala and OFC/ventral aI/fO interact with key nodes of
DMN. The amygdala is both structurally [Amaral and
Price, 1984] and functionally [Roy et al., 2009; Stein et al.,
2007] connected to several DMN structures, including
medial and lateral temporal regions and VMPFC.
Although the spatial resolution of fMRI may not be able to
distinguish neighboring but architectonically distinct
regions, the ventral aI/fO activations found in the current
study are located in the vicinity of a region of caudolateral
OFC described by Price and coworkers as ‘‘intermediate
agranular insula.’’ In monkeys and humans, this area is
separate from dorsal insula and other areas of lateral OFC,
exhibiting dense interconnections with VMPFC, PCC, tem-
poral pole, and medial temporal lobe regions [Carmichael
and Price, 1996; Ongur et al., 2003; Price, 2007; Price and
Drevets, 2010]. It is thus possible that hyperactivations of
amygdala and OFC/ventral aI/fO in OCD reflect height-
ened emotional responses, and that coactivation with
DMN may be linked to internal mentation with a particu-
larly negative focus, although such a suggestion is specu-
lative and remains to be tested.
Not only did several limbic/paralimbic brain regions
exhibit hyperactivation in the OCD group, the amount of
coactivation between regions was more correlated across
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patients. When looking at the relationship between brain
activity on the first draw of certain sequences, significant
correlations were found in both OCD and control groups,
suggesting the presence of a coherent network involving
OFC/aI/fO, amygdala, and DMN across diagnostic cate-
gories. Patients, however, showed significantly more inter-
regional between-subject correlations across hemispheres
and between nodes associated with emotion (amygdala
and OFC/ventral aI/fO) and DMN (temporal pole,
VMPFC, middle temporal, and parahippocampus) on
these trials, suggesting that greater linkage between these
regions may contribute to the overall pattern of hyperacti-
vation seen in OCD.
There are several limitations of the current study. First,
certain sequences were less frequent than uncertain
sequences, which may have influenced findings. Even
though we provide evidence against this critique (see dis-
cussion in Supporting Information), the current results
should be interpreted with caution until they can be repli-
cated in a task using equal numbers of both sequence
types. In addition, although our inclusion criteria for cur-
rent comorbidities were strict, we did allow for the con-
current presence of GAD (n ¼ 1), tic disorder NOS (n ¼
1), and specific phobia (n ¼ 1) in the OCD group, which
may have impacted results. Similarly, although the current
manuscript focuses on the primary comparison of OCD
and non-OCD participants, data suggest that patients with
MDD in remission exhibit differences with healthy indi-
viduals in both brain activity and behavior [Neumeister
et al., 2006; Norbury et al., 2010; Okada et al., 2009;
Thomas et al., 2011]. As such, future work focusing on
OCD may seek to further delineate neural markers of dis-
orders that are frequently comorbid with OCD, such as
MDD. Despite these limitations, the current findings of
behavioral and brain abnormalities during evidence accu-
mulation highlight the importance of internally-focused
mental processes and their relation to decision-making
uncertainty in OCD.
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